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WHAT IF THIRD PARTIES DISAPPEAR? A RATIONAL 
PARTISAN NOTE 
Antonio Caleiro (*) 
1 - Introduction and motivation 
In a seminal paper in the mid-seventies, Nordhaus took a decisive step in 
the development of the theory of political business cycles. The optimisation 
approach assumed in Nordhaus (1975) is implicit in the assumption that the sole 
objective of an opportunistic government is to maximise votes at the following 
election. It also considered myopic and retrospective voters, i. e. a private sector 
that is unable to take into account what happened before the previous election 
and what will happen after the following election. The hypothesised behaviour 
of government and voters leads to an electoral cycle, i. e. recessions at the 
beginning of the term of evety government and inflationary expansions at the 
end of the term. This is generated by the same economic policy, that is the one 
that maximises the number of votes at the following election. 
A critique of the political business cycles a Ia Nordhaus took place in Hibbs 
(1977) which originated the partisan approach to the electoral cycles literature. 
The author considered a new form of action by the party in power as well as 
new behaviour by the voters. In particular, Hibbs (1977) viewed parties as 
representing different social classes with different political preferences. In this 
context, electoral victories are not an objective pf?r se, but rather the necessary 
means to implement the best policy for the class the party represents. 
According to Hibbs' approach, as power rotates, the instruments of economic 
policy will be used with g·reater or less relative intensity. It is assumed that an 
ideological economic policy exists which intends, either to reduce inflation 
(preferably) through the use of monetary policy instruments (preferably), in the 
case of a right-wing government, or which intends to reduce unemployment 
(preferably) through the use of fiscal policy instruments (preferably), in the case 
of a left-wing government. Thus, assuming a partisan approach, it is considered 
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that parties exploit different points on a Phillips curve in order to provide welfare 
gains to their core constituencies (1). 
The empirical literature generated by the initial theoretical studies on electoral 
cycles was not conclusive about their consistency with reality. Partly as a reaction 
to these empirical rejections and partly in respons~ to the rational expectations 
revolution, in the late eighties a new generation of (rational) electoral cycles 
models emerged. A common thread running through this «second-generation» 
models is the assertion that an electoral cycle may occur stochastically if some 
informational insufficiency prevents the electorate from correctly forecasting cru-
cial events, such as the next election results. 
Although some previous studies had considered sophisticated voters, we can 
classify Chappell and Keech (1986) as decisive in the analysis of the influence 
of rational expectations in the political evaluation of voters. If the parties are 
significantly different, then voters can rationally anticipate those differences. 
Following Chappell and Keech (1986), Alesina (1987,1988) «created>> the rational 
partisan approach by considering voters with rational expectations in partisan 
cycle models. By allowing parties to be different in their preferences for economic 
policies on the grounds that they represent different voters who hold different 
interests and ideologies, Alesina concluded that two parties with different opti-
mal policies have different incentives to implement economic policies that differ 
from the ones announced. 
That said, if one follows the approach of modelling parties' behaviour which 
assumes that winning elections is their unique objective then parties will find it 
optimal; via the well-known median-voter theorem, to support policies more 
moderate than their ideology. These policies would result in a higher probability 
of being elected. Thus, the crucial implication of this behaviour (for a two-party 
system) is that, if the (two) parties have the same information about voters' 
preferences, there is a full convergence of policies, i. e. (both) parties follow the 
same policy when in office. Yet, there is a time inconsistency issue which prevent 
us from accepting this result outright. Parties who have ideological preferences 
concerning policies, i. e. which are not purely opportunistic a Ia Nordhaus, still 
have an incentive to announce convergent proposals to increase their chances 
of being elected. However, once elected, each party has the incentive to renege 
the proposed policy because it does not correspond entirely to its ideological 
aims. In fact, the winning party will implement its most preferred policy if it is 
not committed to its electoral platform. If voters are modelled as rational and 
(')In Minford and Peel (1982) and Minford (1990) an interesting «alternative» is considered, 
which can be classified as intermediate between the opportunistic and partisan approaches. It is 
assumed that parties are supported by their core constituencies and some floating voters, who 
determine the election outcome. In this case, the maximisation of some objective function leads to 
the best trade-off between the chances of winning elections and assuring the loyalty of parties 
support constituencies. 
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forward-looking agents they will take into account this ex-post incentive and vote 
accordingly. Thus, if the electoral length period is finite, the only time-consistent 
electoral equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible and the (two) 
candidates follow their most preferred policies when elected. 
In reality, it is common to observe that many democratic political systems 
are, in fact, constituted by two main parties which occupy positions awfly from 
the extremes of the political spectrum. This may or may not be seen as a 
vindication of the median-voter theorem. If one takes the tendency to such a 
political set-up as given, the following question arises: what are the consequences 
for a country moving from a three-party to a two-party system? In this note, the 
consequences on the inflationary equilibrium bias of such a transformation will 
be presented (2). In carrying out this exercise, the rational partisan approach 
outlined above will be followed. The rest of the note is structured as follows. 
Section 2 presents the three-party system model and it is followed by section 3 
where the two-party system model is presented. Section 4 concludes. 
2 - The three-party system 
Concerning the three parties', L, R, D, objective function, let us assume that 
disutility in each period is a quadratic function of the deviations of output, C/t, 




nt are the inflation expectations, for period t, at time t-1, given by: 
(3) 
and 11_ 1 is the information set available at t-1. 
In addition, let us assume that eL < eR, that is, party R favours a less 
inflationary policy than party L. No assumption is made on party as relative 
concern about inflation. 
· (2) Obviously, one can study the consequences of introducing a third party, reading 
«backwards». 
(3) Output q, is measured from the natural rate. In other words, q, = y, - y*, where y, is 
output (in natural logs) and y * is its value at the natural rate of unemployment. Hence the fact 
that q > 0 means the usual «assumption» that the target level of output exceeds the natural rate 
of output; see, inter alia, King (1997) or Persson and Tabellini (1999). 
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Concerning the policy instrument, ·let us assume that the party in power at 
period t, selects ipflation 7tt to maximise its utility given by (1 ), subject to the 
structure of the economy given by (2) and (3). 
One party is elected at the beginning of each period with some (exogenously 
given) probability {i, i = L, R, D. (4). In this framework, the value functions tor 
the three parties are: 
Vii,t = max {- {~qt- ql2 + 9ln 2t J + ~ ~LVLi,t+1 + pRVRi,t+1 + P0V0i,t+~}} (4) 
1tt 
where V J.1+1 denotes the value function of party j when, at time t+ 1, party i is in 
power. 
In this case, the time consistent solution can be obtained by considering 
the limit to the infinite case of the solution for the finite horizon case. If, say, 
period T is the final period then the value function V ). r +1= 0. That said, it is 
straightforward to show that, from the optimisation of the value function, party i 
should set: 
(5) 
The assumption of rational expectations implies that: 
(6) 
Substituting (6) into (5) and solving for nLr. nRr and n°r it is possible to 
obtain the discretionary equilibrium solutions for the inflation rates chosen by 




where L'1 is a constant term (5). 
(
4
) This is a «costless» assumption because the so-called partisan effect, i. e. Jt", * 1t1 only 
occurs on the period immediately after the election. Every other (non-election) period would be 
characterised by the same growth rate independently of the incumbent's type. 
(5) 8=U4 (9LpL + 9RpR + 9Dpil) + a.2 [9R9D (1-pL) + 9L9D (1-pR) + 9L9R (1-pD)] + 9L9R9D. 
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From the analysis of the solutions (7), (8), (9), it is clear that they. are time 
consistent given that equilibrium inflation rates depend only on exogenous 
elements. In fact, the value function for each period t will be a constant, making 
it possible, then, to solve the intertemporal dynamic optimisation problem by 
considering each period (static) solution. In other words, these solutions will be 
valid not only for the terminal period T but for all other periods t = 0,1 , ... ,oo. 
Concerning the properties of the equilibrium determined above, it is evident 
that there is inflationary bias since ni1 > 0, "ii,t. Moreover, the dependence of n; 
on elements concerning the other parties j* i -namely; the' weights e; and 
probabilities of re-election pi- makes interesting to study the ••dynamics» 
involved in the interaction between the solutions. In particular, it is apparent that 
nL > nR and that n° will be the highest, the intermediate or the lowest solution 
Value When e0 < eL, eL < e0 < eR Or eR < e0 , respectively. 
3 - The two-party system 
Now, let us assume that the three-party system becomes a two-party one 
as the result of party D becoming extinct. Following the procedure described 
before, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium solutions for the inflation 
rates chosen by the remaining two parties are: 
a &2 + eR) 
nL T = a2 (aLp'- + eRpR) + eLeR q > 0 (10) 
(11) 
As expected, the properties of this solution are similar to the ones concerning 
the previous solution, that is, the existence of an inflationary bias. and nL > nR. 
4 -Conclusions 
What are the consequences on the inflationary bias if party D disappears? 
From (5) it is obvious that there will be no consequences on the inflationary 
bias if the expected rate of inflation is the same in both systems (6), that is, 
when E[n3 ] = pL3 nL3 + pR3 nR3 + p03 n°3 coincides with E[n2l = pL2 nL2 + pR2 nR2· 
(6 ) Note that the subscript 3 will identify elements concerning the three-party system, while 
the subscript 2 will perform that role for the two-party system. 
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What are the circumstances in which this case may occur? From (7) to (9) and 
then from (1 0) to (11 ), one can easily obtain that: 
and: L R 
~+~ 
o.2 + aL o.2 + aR 
E[~] = ------'-- q 
2 L 2 R 
1 _ _ o._P_2 _ _ ~
o.2 + aL o.2 + aR 
Ignoring p03 = 0 as the trivial solution of E[n3 ] = E[n2 ], let us proceed with 
the analysis by the study of the various possible cases concerning the «posi-
tion>> of party D in the political spectrum. In this sense: 
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1) If e0 = eL, that is, if the srd party was as inflationist as party L, then 
the two remaining parties do not change their optimal policies, i.e. 
ni2 = n1~, i = L, R, if party L sees its probability of being elected 
increased by exactly the amount that was attributed to party D, i.e., 
when pl2 = pl3 + p03 <=? rf'l2 = rf'l3. If so, E[ns ] = E[n2 ]; 
2) For the case e0 = eR, the same invariance of policies occurs, n;2 = ni3, 
if party R sees its probability of being elected increased by exactly 
the amount that was attributed to party D, i. e., when 
pR2 = pR3 + p03 <=? pl2 = pl3. Obviously, E[n3 ] = E[~ ]; 
3) What if eL < e0 < eL? In this case, one can prove that the same pro-
portion of probabilities of re-election for parties L and R in both 
systems, i. e.: 
and e0 = S0 = E[~ l q ~II be compatib~e with n;2 = ni3 , i =· L, R, and 
E[n3 ] = E[n2 ]. If e0 > 6° (resp. e0 < eD), the inflationary bias will 
increase (resp. decrease), that is, n;2 > n;3 (resp. n;2 < nh), i = L,R, 
as E[n2] > E[n3 ] {resp. E[n2] < E[n3 ]}; 
4) If e0 > eil, an hypothetical increase in the expected inflation -which 
will always depend on how the probabilities of elections are re-
-allocated - becomes the less plausible the higher is e0 . The 
analysis of this case can be done easily after trivial modifications 
to the following (and last) case which we will use as an illustra-
tion; 
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5) To illustrate the case where e0 < eL, let us consider figure 1, which 
gives the pairs (e0 , pi-2} and (e0 , pR2) such that E[n2 ] = E[n3 ]: 
FIGURE 1 
p 
eo eL eR Particular values 
From the previous figure, one can verify that in order to have E[n2 ] = 
= E[n3 ], party R has to loose some part of its probability of being 
re-elected, i.e., p R2 = f5 R2 < f5 R3. If, in fact, p R2 > f5 R2 (resp. p R2 < p R2), 
the inflationary bias will decrease (resp. increase) as E[n2 ] < E[n3 ] 
{resp. E[~] > E[n3 ]}. In particular, if for party 0, inflation is sufficiently 
(relatively) unimportant it might be impossible to verify the necessary 
decrease in pR. In this case, the inflationary bias will always decrease 
after «reducing•• the three-party system to a two-party one (1). 
(') In a sense, this may be viewed as a simple confirmation of a well-known stylised fact 
which characterises this kind of models, namely the electoral disadvantage resulting from small 
degrees of inflation aversion e. Because there will be always an inflationary bias, the smaller the 
degree of inflation aversion the higher are the utility costs. 
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